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$Title{Rollin's Ancient History: Ancient History Of The Carthaginians
Section 2.}
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$Date{1731}
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Title:       Rollin's Ancient History: Ancient History Of The Carthaginians
Book:        Chapter III.
Author:      Rollin, Charles
Date:        1731

Section 2.

The First Punic War (Continued)

     The two armies being thus drawn up, waited only for the signal.
Xanthippus ordered the elephants to advance, to break the ranks of the enemy;
and commanded the two wings of the cavalry to charge the Romans in flank.  At
the same time, the latter, clashing their arms, and shouting after the manner
of their country, advanced against the enemy.  Their cavalry did not stand the
onset long, it being so much inferior to that of the Carthaginians.  The
infantry of the left wing, to avoid the attacks of the elephants, and show how
little they feared the mercenaries who formed the enemy's right wing, attacks
it, puts it to flight, and pursues it to the camp.  Those in the first ranks,
who were opposed to the elephants, were broken and trodden under foot, after
fighting valiantly; and the rest of the main body stood firm for some time, by
reason of its great depth. But the rear, being attacked in flank by the
enemy's cavalry, and obliged to face about and receive it, and those who had
broken through the elephants, met the phalanx of the Carthaginians, which had
not yet engaged, and which received them in good order, the Romans were routed
on all sides, and entirely defeated.  The greatest part of them were crushed
to death by the enormous weight of the elephants; and the remainder, standing
in their ranks, were shot through and through with arrows from the enemy's
horse.  Only a small number fled, and as they were in an open country, the
horse and elephants killed a great part of them.  Five hundred, or
thereabouts, who went off with Regulus, were taken prisoners with him.  The
Carthaginians, lost, in this battle, eight hundred mercenaries, who were
opposed to the left wing of the Romans: and of the latter only two thousand
escaped, who, by their pursuing the enemy's right wing, had drawn themselves
out of the engagement.  All the rest, Regulus and those who were taken with
him excepted, were left dead in the field. The two thousand who had escaped
the slaughter retired to Clypea, and were saved in an almost miraculous
manner.

     The Carthaginians, after having stripped the dead, entered Carthage in
triumph, dragged after them the unfortunate Regulus, and five hundred
prisoners.  Their joy was so much the greater, as, but a very few days before,
they had seen themselves upon the brink of ruin.  The men and women, old and
young, crowded the temples, to return thanks to the gods; and several days
were devoted wholly to festivities and rejoicings.

     Xanthippus, who had contributed so much to this happy change, had the
wisdom to withdraw shortly after, from the apprehension lest his glory, which
had hitherto been unsullied, might, after this first blaze, insensibly fade
away, and leave him exposed to the darts of envy and calumny, which are always
dangerous, but most in a foreign country, when a man stands alone, unsupported
by friends, relations, or any other succor.

     Polybius tells us, that Xanthippus' departure was related in a different
manner, and he promises to take notice of it in another place, but that part
of his history has not come down to us.  We read in Appian, ^747 that the
Carthaginians, excited by a mean and detestable jealousy of Xanthippus' glory,
and unable to bear the thoughts that they should stand indebted to Sparta for
their safety, upon pretence of conducting him and his attendants back with
honor to his own country, with a numerous convoy of ships, gave private orders
to have them all put to death in their passage; as if, with him, they could
have buried in the waves for ever the memory of his services, and their horrid
ingratitude to him. ^748.

[Footnote 747: De Bell. Pun. p. 30.]

[Footnote 748: This perfidious action, as it is related by Appian, may
possibly be true, when we consider the character of the Carthaginians, who
were certainly a cruel and treacherous people.  But if it be fact, one would
wonder why Polybius should reserve for another occasion, the relation of an
incident, which comes in most properly here, as it finishes at once the
character and life of Xanthippus.  His silence therefore in this place, makes
me think that he intended to bring Xanthippus again upon the stage, and to
exhibit him to the reader in a different light from that in which he is placed
by Appian.  To this let me add, that it showed no great depth of policy in the
Carthaginians, to take this method of despatching him, when so many others
offered, which were less liable to censure.  In this scheme formed for his
destruction, not only himself, but all his followers, were to be murdered,
without the pretence of even a storm, or loss of one single Carthaginian, to
cover or excuse the perpetration of so horrid a crime.]

     This battle, says Polybius, ^749 though not so considerable as many
others, may yet furnish very salutary instructions; which, adds that author,
is the greatest benefit that can be reaped from the study of history.

[Footnote 749: Lib. i. p. 36, 37.]

     First, should any man promise himself permanent good fortune, after he
has considered the fate of Regulus?  That general, insolent with victory,
inexorable to the conquered, and deaf to all their remonstrances, saw himself
a few days after vanquished by them, and made their prisoner. Hannibal
suggested the same reflection to Scipio, when he exhorted him not to be
dazzled with the success of his arms.  Regulus, said he, would have been
recorded among the few instances of valor and felicity, had he, after the
victory obtained in this very country, granted our fathers the peace which
they sued for.  But, putting no bounds to his ambition and the insolence of
success, the greater his prosperity, the more ignominious was his fall. ^750.

[Footnote 750: Inter pauca felicitatis virtutisque exempla, M. Atilius quondam
in hac Adem terra fuisset, si victor pacem petentibus dedisset patribus
nostris.  Sed bon statuendo tandem felicitati modum, nec cohibende efferentem
se fortunam, quanto altius elatus erat, eo foedius corruit. - Liv. l. xxx. n.
30.]

     In the second place, the truth of the saying of Euripides is here seen in
its full extent, That one wise head is worth a great many hands. ^751 A single
man here changes the whole face of affairs.  On one hand, he defeats troops
which were thought invincible; on the other, he revives the courage of a city
and an army, whom he had found in consternation and despair.

[Footnote 751: It may not be improper to take notice in this place, as it was
forgotten before, of a mistake of the learned Casaubon, in his translation of
a passage of Polybius, concerning Xanthippus.  The passage is thus rendered by
Casaubon: In queis [militibus sc. Graecia allatis] Xanthippus quidam fuit
Lacedaemonius, vir disciplina Laconica imbutus, et qui rei militaris usum
mediocrem habebat. Whereas, agreeably with the whole character and conduct of
Xanthippus, I take the sense of the passage to be, a man formed by the Spartan
discipline, and proportionably [not moderately] skilled in military affairs.]

     Such, as Polybius observes, is the use which ought to be made of the
study of history.  For there being two ways of acquiring improvement and
instruction, first, by one's own experience, and, secondly, by that of other
men; it is much more wise and useful to improve by other men's miscarriages
than by our own.

     I return to Regulus, that I may here finish what relates to him;
Polybius, to our great disappointment, taking no farther notice of that
general. ^752

[Footnote 752: This silence of Polybius has prejudiced a great many learned
men against many of the stories told of Regulus' barbarous treatment, after he
was taken by the Carthaginians.  Mr. Rollin speaks no farther of this matter,
and therefore I shall give my reader the substance of what is brought against
the general belief of the Roman writers (as well historians as poets), and of
Appian, on this subject.  First, it is urged that Polybius was very sensible
that the story of these cruelties was false; and therefore, that he might not
disoblige the Romans, by contradicting so general a belief, he chose rather to
be silent concerning Regulus after he was taken prisoner, than to violate the
truth of history, of which he was so strict an observer.  This opinion is
farther strengthened, say the adversaries of this belief, by a fragment of
Diodorus, which says, that the wife of Regulus, exasperated at the death of
her husband at Carthage, occasioned, as she imagined, by barbarous usage,
persuaded her sons to revenge the fate of their father, by the cruel treatment
of two Carthaginian captives (thought to be Bostar and Hamilcar), taken in the
sea-fight against Sicily, after the misfortune of Regulus, and put into her
hands for the redemption of her husband.  One of these died by the severity of
his imprisonment; and the other, by the care of the senate, who detested the
cruelty, survived, and was restored to health.  This treatment of the
captives, and the resentment of the senate on that account, form a third
argument or presumption against the truth of this story of Regulus, which is
thus argued: - Regulus dying in his captivity, by the usual course of nature,
his wife, thus frustrated of her hopes of redeeming him by the exchange of her
captives, treated them with the utmost barbarity, in consequence of her belief
of the ill usage which Regulus had received.  The senate being angry with her
for it, to give some color to her cruelties, she gave out among her
acquaintance and kindred, that her husband died in the way generally related.
This, like all other reports, increased gradually; and, from the national
hatred between the Carthaginians and Romans, was easily and generally believed
by the latter.  How far this is conclusive against the testimonies of two such
weighty authors as Cicero and Seneca (to say nothing of the poets), is left to
the judgment of the reader.]

     After being kept some years in prison, he was sent to Rome, to propose an
exchange of prisoners. ^753 He had been obliged to take an oath, that he would
return in case he proved unsuccessful.  He then acquainted the senate with the
subject of his voyage; and being invited by them to give his opinion freely,
he answered that he could no longer do it as a senator, having lost both this
quality, and that of a Roman citizen, from the time that he had fallen into
the hands of his enemies; but he did not refuse to offer his thoughts as a
private person.  This was a very delicate affair.  Every one was touched with
the misfortunes of so great a man.  He needed only, says Cicero, to have
spoken one word, and it would have restored him to his liberty, his estate,
his dignity, his wife, his children, and his country; but that word appeared
to him contrary to the honor and welfare of the state.  He therefore plainly
declared that an exchange of prisoners ought not to be so much as thought of;
that such an example would be of fatal consequence to the republic; that
citizens, who had so basely surrendered their arms and persons to the enemy,
were unworthy of the least compassion, and incapable of serving their country;
that with regard to himself, as he was so far advanced in years, his death
ought to be considered as nothing, whereas they had in their hands several
Carthaginian generals, in the flower of their age, and capable of doing their
country great services for many years.  It was with difficulty that the senate
complied with so generous and unexampled a counsel.

[Footnote 753: A. M. 3755.  A. Rome, 499.  Appian de Bello Pun. pp. 2, 3. Cic.
de Off. l. iii. n. 99, 100.  Aul. Gel. l. vi. c. 4.  Senec. Ep. 99.]

     The illustrious exile therefore left Rome, in order to return to
Carthage, unmoved either with the deep affliction of his friends, or the tears
of his wife and children, although he knew but too well the grievous torments
which were prepared for him. ^754 And, indeed, the moment his enemies saw him
returned without having obtained the exchange of prisoners, they put him to
every kind of torture their barbarous cruelty could invent.  They imprisoned
him for a long time in a dismal dungeon, whence, after cutting off his
eyelids, they drew him at once into the sun, when its beams darted the
strongest heat.  They next put him into a kind of chest stuck full of nails,
whose points wounding him, did not allow him a moment's ease either day or
night.  Lastly, after having been long tormented by being kept for ever awake
in this dreadful torture, his merciless enemies nailed him to a cross, their
usual punishment, and left him to expire on it.  Such was the end of this
great man.  His enemies, by depriving him of some days, perhaps years of life,
brought eternal infamy on themselves.

[Footnote 754: Horat. l. iii. Od. 3.]

     The blow which the Romans had received in Africa did not discourage them.
They made greater preparations than before to recover their loss; and sent to
sea, the following campaign, three hundred and sixty vessels. ^755 The
Carthaginians sailed out to meet them with two hundred, but were beat in an
engagement fought on the coast of Sicily, and a hundred and fourteen of their
ships were taken by the Romans.  These sailed into Africa, to take in the few
soldiers who had escaped the pursuit of the enemy, after the defeat of
Regulus, and had defended themselves vigorously in Clupea, ^756 where they had
been unsuccessfully besieged.

[Footnote 755: Polyb. l. viii. p. 37.]

[Footnote 756: Or Clypea.]

     Here again we are astonished that the Romans, after so considerable a
victory, and with so large a fleet, should sail into Africa, only to bring
from thence a small garrison; whereas they might have attempted the conquest
of it, since Regulus with much fewer forces, had almost completed it.

     The Romans were overtaken by a storm in their return, which almost
destroyed their whole fleet. ^757 The like misfortune befell them also the
following year. ^758 However, they consoled themselves for this double loss,
by a victory which they gained over Asdrubal, from whom they took near a
hundred and forty elephants.  This news being brought to Rome, it filled the
whole city with joy, not only because the strength of the enemy's army was
considerably diminished by the loss of their elephants, but chiefly because
this victory had inspired the land forces with fresh courage, who since the
defeat of Regulus, had not dared to venture upon an engagement, so great was
the terror with which those formidable animals had filled the minds of all the
soldiers.  It was therefore judged proper to make a greater effort than ever,
in order to finish, if possible, a war which had continued fourteen years.
The two consuls set sail with a fleet of two hundred ships, and arriving in
Sicily, formed the bold design of besieging Lilybaeum.  This was the strongest
town in which the Carthaginians possessed in Sicily; and the loss of it would
be attended with that of every part of the island, and open to the Romans a
free passage into Africa.

[Footnote 757: Polyb. l. vii. p. 38-40.]

[Footnote 758: Polyb. l. vii. p. 41, 42.]

     The reader will suppose that the utmost ardor was shown both in the
assault and defence of the place. ^759 Imilcon was governor there, with ten
thousand regular forces, exclusive of the inhabitants; and Hannibal, son of
Hamilcar, soon brought him as many more from Carthage, he having, with the
most intrepid courage, forced his way through the enemy's fleet, and arrived
happily in the port.  The Romans had not lost any time.  Having brought
forward their engines, they beat down several towers with their battering
rams, and gaining ground daily, they made such progress as gave the besieged,
who were now closely pressed, some fears.  The governor saw plainly that there
was no other way left to save the city, but by firing the engines of the
besiegers.  Having therefore prepared his forces for this enterprise, he sent
them out at daybreak, with torches in their hands, tow, and all kinds of
combustible matters, and at the same time attacked all the engines.  The
Romans strove, with unparalleled bravery, to repel them, and the engagement
was very bloody.  Every man, assailant as well as defendant, stood to his post
and chose to die rather than to quit it.  At last, after a long resistance and
dreadful slaughter, the besieged sounded a retreat, and left the Romans in
possession of their works.  This scene being over, Hannibal, embarking in the
night, and concealing his departure from the enemy, sailed for Drepanum, where
Adherbal commanded for the Carthaginians.  Drepanum was advantageously
situated, having a commodious port, and lying about a hundred and twenty
furlongs from Lilybaeum; and was of so much consequence to the Carthaginians,
that they had been always very desirous of preserving it.

[Footnote 759: Polyb. l. i. p. 44-59.]

     The Romans, animated by their late success, renewed the attack with
greater vigor than ever, the besieged not daring to venture a second time to
burn their machines, because of the ill success they had met with, in their
first attempt.  But a furious wind rising suddenly, some mercenary soldiers
represented to the governer, that now was the favorable opportunity for them
to fire the engines of the besiegers, especially as the wind blew full against
them, and they offered themselves for the enterprise.  The offer was accepted,
and accordingly they were furnished with every thing necessary.  In a moment
the fire catched on all the engines, and the Romans could not possibly
extinguish it, because the flames being instantly spread everywhere, the wind
carried the sparks and smoke full into their eyes, so that they could not see
where to apply relief, whereas their enemies saw clearly where to aim their
strokes, and throw their fire.  This accident made the Romans lose all hopes
of being ever able to carry the place by force.  They therefore turned the
siege into a blockade, raised a line of contravallation round the town, and
dispersing their army in every part of the neighborhood, resolved to effect by
time, what they found themselves absolutely unable to perform in any other
way.

     When the transactions of the siege of Lilybaeum, and the loss of part of
the forces, were known at Rome, the citizens, so far from desponding at this
ill news, seemed to be fired with new vigor. ^760 Every man strove to be
foremost in the muster-roll; so that, in a very little time, an army of ten
thousand men was raised, who, crossing the strait, marched by land to join the
besiegers.

[Footnote 760: Polyb. lib. i. p. 50.]

     At the same time, P. Claudius Pulcher, the consul, formed a design of
attacking Adherbal in Drepanum. ^761 He thought himself sure of surprising
him, because, after the loss lately sustained by the Romans at Lilybaeum, the
enemy could not imagine that they would venture out again at sea. Flushed with
these hopes, he sailed out with his fleet in the night, the better to conceal
his design.  But he had to do with an active general, whose vigilance he could
not elude, and who did not even give him time to draw up his ships in line of
battle, but fell vigorously upon him, while his fleet was in disorder and
confusion.  The Carthaginians gained a complete victory.  Of the Roman fleet,
only thirty vessels got off, which being in company with the consul, fled with
him, and got away in the best manner they could, along the coast.  All the
rest, amounting to fourscore and thirteen, with the men on board them, were
taken by the Carthaginians; a few soldiers excepted, who had escaped from the
shipwreck of their vessels.  This victory displayed as much the prudence and
valor of Adherbal, as it reflected shame and ignominy on the Roman consul.

[Footnote 761: A. M. 3756.  A. Rome, 500.  Polyb. l. i. p. 51.]

     Junius, ^762 his colleague, was neither more prudent nor more fortunate
than himself, but lost almost his whole fleet by his ill conduct.  Endeavoring
to atone for his misfortune by some considerable action, he held a secret
correspondence with the inhabitants of Eryx, ^763 and by that means got the
city surrendered to him.  On the summit of the mountain stood the temple of
Venus Erycina, which was certainly the most beautiful, as well as the richest
of all the Sicilian temples.  The city stood a little below the summit of this
mountain, and the road that led to it was very long, and of difficult access.
Junius posted one part of his troops upon the top, and the remainder at the
foot of the mountain, imagining that he now had nothing to fear; but Hamilcar,
surnamed Barcha, father of the famous Hannibal, found means to get into the
city, which lay between the two camps of the enemy, and there fortified
himself.  From this advantageous post, he harassed the Romans incessantly for
two years. One can scarce conceive how it was possible for the Carthaginians
to defend themselves, when thus attacked from both the summit and foot of the
mountain, and unable to get provisions, but from a little port, which was the
only one open to them.  By such enterprises as these, the abilities and
prudent courage of a general are as well, or perhaps better discovered, than
by the winning of a battle.

[Footnote 762: Polyb. l. i. p. 54-59.]

[Footnote 763: A city and mountain of Sicily.]

     For five years, nothing memorable was performed on either side. ^764 The
Romans were once of opinion, that their land forces would alone be capable of
finishing the siege of Lilybaeum: but the war being protracted beyond their
expectation, they returned to their first plan, and made extraordinary efforts
to fit out a new fleet.  The public treasury was at a low ebb; but this want
was supplied by private purses, so ardent was the love which the Romans bore
to their country.  Every man, according to his circumstances, contributed to
the common expense; and upon public security, advanced money, without the
least scruple, for an expedition on which the glory and safety of Rome
depended.  One man fitted out a ship at his own charge; another was equipped
by the contributions of two or three; so that in a very little time, two
hundred were ready for sailing.  The command was given to Lutatius the consul,
who immediately put to sea. ^765 The enemy's fleet had retired into Africa, by
which means the consul easily seized upon all the advantageous posts in the
neighborhood of Lilybaeum: and foreseeing that he should soon be forced to
fight, he did all that lay in his power to assure himself of success, and
employed the interval in exercising his soldiers and seamen at sea.

[Footnote 764: Polyb. l. i. p. 59-63.]

[Footnote 765: A. M. 3763.  A. Rome, 507.]

     He was soon informed that the Carthaginian fleet drew near, under the
command of Hanno, who landed in a small island called Hiera, opposite to
Drepanum.  His design was to reach Eryx undiscovered by the Romans, in order
to supply the army there; to reinforce his troops and take Barcha on board to
assist him in the expected engagement.  But the consul, suspecting his
intention, was beforehand with him; and having assembled all his best forces,
sailed for the small island Aegusa, ^766 which lay near the other.  He
acquainted his officers with the design he had of attacking the enemy on the
morrow.  Accordingly, at daybreak, he prepared to engage; unfortunately the
wind was favorable for the enemy, which made him hesitate whether he should
give them battle.  But considering that the Carthaginian fleet, when unloaded
of its provisions, would become lighter and more fit for action, and besides
would be considerably strengthened by the forces and presence of Barcha, he
came to a resolution at once; and, notwithstanding the foul weather, made
directly to the enemy.  The consul had choice forces, able seamen, and
excellent ships, built after the model of a galley that had been lately taken
from the enemy; and which was the most complete of its kind that had ever been
seen.  The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were destitute of all these
advantages.  As they had been the entire masters at sea for some years, and
the Romans did not once dare to face them, they had them in the high est
contempt, and looked upon themselves as invincible.  On the first report of
the enemy being in motion, the Carthaginians had put to sea a fleet fitted out
in haste, as appeared from every circumstance of it: the soldiers and seamen
being all mercenaries, newly levied, without the least experience, resolution,
or zeal, since it was not for their own country they were going to fight. This
soon appeared in the engagement.  They could not sustain the first attack.
Fifty of their vessels were sunk, and seventy taken, with their whole crews.
The rest, favored by a wind which rose very seasonably for them, made the best
of their way to the little island from whence they had sailed.  There were
upwards of ten thousand taken prisoners.  The consul sailed immediately for
Lilybaeum, and joined his forces to those of the besiegers.

[Footnote 766: They are now called Aegates.]

     When the news of his defeat arrived at Carthage, it occasioned so much
the greater surprise and terror, as it was less expected.  The senate,
however, did not lose their courage, though they saw themselves quite unable
to continue the war.  As the Romans were now masters of the sea, it was
impossible for the Carthaginians to send either provisions or reinforcements
to the armies in Sicily.  An express was therefore immediately despatched to
Barcha, the general there, empowering him to act as he should think proper.
Barcha, so long as he had room to entertain the least hopes, had done every
thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage, and the most
consummate wisdom.  But having now no resource left, he sent a deputation to
the consul, in order to treat about a peace.  Prudence, says Polybius,
consists in knowing how to resist or to yield at a seasonable conjuncture.
Lutatius was not insensible how tired the Romans were grown of a war, which
had exhausted them both of men and money; and the dreadful consequences which
had attended on the inexorable and imprudent obstinacy of Regulus was fresh in
his memory.  He therefore complied without difficulty, and dictated the
following treaty:

     "There shall be peace between Rome and Carthage (in case the Roman people
approve of it) on the following conditions: The Carthaginians shall entirely
evacuate all Sicily; shall no longer make war upon Hiero, the Syracusans, or
their allies; they shall restore to the Romans without ransom, all the
prisoners which they have taken from them; and pay them, within twenty years,
two thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver." ^767 It is worth the
reader's remarking, by the way, the simple, exact, and clear terms in which
this treaty is expressed: that, in so short a compass, adjusts the interests,
both by sea and land, of two powerful republics and their allies.

[Footnote 767: This sum amounts to near six millions one hundred and eighty
thousand French livres, or $2,286,600.]

     When these conditions were brought to Rome, the people, not approving of
them, sent ten commissioners to Sicily, to terminate the affair.  These made
no alteration as to the substance of the treaty; only shortening the time
appointed for the payment, reducing it to ten years: a thousand talents were
added to the sum that had been stipulated, which was to be paid immediately;
and the Carthaginians were required to depart from all the islands situated
between Italy and Sicily. ^768 Sardinia was not comprehended in this treaty,
but they gave it up by another treaty some years after.

[Footnote 768: Polyb. l. iii. p. 182.]

     Such was the conclusion of this war, the longest mentioned in history,
since it continued twenty-four years without intermission. ^769 The obstinacy,
in disputing for empire, was equal on either side; the same resolution, the
same greatness of soul, in forming as well as in executing projects, being
conspicuous on both sides.  The Carthaginians had the superiority with regard
to experience in naval affairs; in the strength and swiftness of their
vessels; the working of them; the skill and capacity of the pilots; the
knowledge of coasts, shallows, roads, and winds; and in the inexhaustible fund
of wealth, which furnished all the expenses of so long and obstinate a war.
The Romans had none of these advantages; but their courage, zeal for the
public good, love of their country, and a noble emulation of glory, supplied
all other deficiencies. We are astonished to see a nation, so raw and
inexperienced in naval affairs, not only disputing the sea with a people who
were best skilled in them, and more powerful than any that had ever been
before; but even gaining several victories over them at sea.  No difficulties
or calamities could discourage them.  They certainly would not have thought of
peace, in the circumstances under which the Carthaginians demanded it.  One
unfortunate campaign dispirits the next; whereas the Romans were not shaken by
a succession of them.

[Footnote 769: A. M. 3736.  A. Carth, 605.  A. Rome, 507.  Ant, J. C. 241.]

     As to the soldiers, there was no comparison between those of Rome and of
Carthage, the former being infinitely superior in point of courage; among the
generals who commanded in this war, Hamilcar, surnamed Barcha, was doubtless
the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence.